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Summary: In this paper the author discusses Lacan's changing theory of the subject in the early texts
of the Écrits and relates it to the notion of “the lie” in psychoanalysis. As Lacan’s view of the subject
shifts form the Imaginary to the Symbolic, the source of man’s primordial discord and alienation shifts
from being located in the relationship to the image to finding its source in the relationship to the
signifier. We could qualify the shift from an imaginary to a symbolic subject theory as a shift from one
kind of not wanting to know to another, as a shift from one kind of lie to another. We discuss this as a
shift from méconnaissance in the Imaginary to  mensonge in the Symbolic. We conclude with a few
remarks on the notion of truth in psychoanalysis, the consequences for clinical practice and the role of
the psychoanalyst, who is now redefined as a practitioner of the symbolic function.
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Introduction
In this talk I will discuss Lacan's changing theory of the subject in the early texts of the Écrits 2
and relate it to the notion of “the lie” in psychoanalysis. In my view, the only way to make
sense of a concept or an idea of Lacan is to trace its development throughout his teaching.
When we ask ourselves, “What does Lacan say about, for instance, transference?” the next
question should always be, “When?” Because Lacan's ideas keep evolving, the answer will be
different whether it is given in the context of his thinking in the forties, the fifties, etc. Here, I
focus on the transition between subject theories during the forties and early fifties.
First,  I  will  discuss  Lacan's  shift  from the subject  of the Imaginary  to  the subject  of  the
Symbolic, then I will talk about what this shift means for the way we conceptualize the lie in
psychoanalysis. Finally, I discuss the consequences for clinical practice and the role of the
psychoanalyst.
From the Imaginary to the Symbolic
In Lacan's early thinking about psychoanalysis, we see a gradual shift from what we could
call a theory about the subject of the Imaginary to a theory about the subject of the Symbolic.
The first  theory is  developed in the thirties  and early forties,  with the relationship  of the
subject to the image as main element. The second theory gradually takes shape during the
forties  and  culminates  in  the  mission  statement  “The  Function  and  Field  of  Speech  and
Language in Psychoanalysis” in 1953, with as main element the relationship of the subject to
the signifier. In lacanian thought, we always have to understand “the subject” not as some
1 Paper presented at the 2018 Lacan Écrits Conference, Ghent. The paper contains ideas that were
developed in collaboration with panel members Constance De Meulder and Dimitri Van Puymbroeck
whose contribution is gratefully acknowledged. 
2 All quotes are from: Lacan, J. (2006[1966]). Écrits. The first complete edition in English (B. Fink,
Trans.). New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.
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underlying,  hidden essence,  but as “being the effect of,” and at the same time “being the
bearer  of.” So his thinking goes from “the subject  as being an effect  (and bearer)  of the
Imaginary” to “the subject as being an effect (and bearer) of the Symbolic.”
A fundamental discord
At the heart of Lacan's theory of the subject, there is always a fundamental dissonance, the
source and location  of which changes  and evolves  during the course of his  teaching,  but
which  remains  a  basic  assumption  throughout  his  different  ways  of  conceptualizing  the
subject. 
As we heard in the previous lecture, in Lacan's theory of the subject of the Imaginary, he
situates  man's  primordial  discord,  the  fundamental  lack-of-being  in  the  workings  of  the
Imaginary. There, the identification with the image of the other is the attempted solution for
this primordial discord and at the same time the source of further alienation and anxiety. In
this view the subject is an effect of the Imaginary. The subject is at the same time constituted
and alienated by the identification with the image of the other. 
Gradually, Lacan situates the source of this fundamental discord, and of subjectivity, more
and more in the realm of the Symbolic. When he talks about the subject of the Symbolic
(which we could also call the subject of language) the main source of alienation is no longer
the identification with an image (although this remains operative at the level of the ego) but is
now to be found in the way we are constituted by language. Here, the subject is formed and
determined by the Symbolic order and the workings of the signifying chains.
Alienation in the Symbolic
In the same way the image was a source of further alienation, because the imaginary unity is
bound to remain  an unattainable  ideal,  now the  signifier is  a  source of further  alienation
because we never fully coincide with the words we use to describe ourselves. The more I try
to explain who and what I am, the more I feel it's impossible to capture anything resembling
an essence. The more I talk about myself, the more I feel something eludes me. Just as, in the
realm of the Imaginary, I will never fully be a man, a waiter, a psychoanalyst, although I have
played at being each of those, in the realm of the Symbolic, none of those signifiers manages
to say the last word about me. 
The more I try to define what I am as a man, for instance, the more I am divided by the word
man, and the more I try to grasp the essence of that word man, the less it means and the more
I am grasping at straws. I find only the man-sized, man-made, man-hole of my manhood. I
come out as a hollow man, a straw man, a con man, the man of the hour, a self-made man, a
man of letters, a man of his word, a man of few words, but always just the word, man. But just
what it means to be a man, a man's man, a man of means, what the word man means, escapes
me. As Bo Diddley concluded: “I'm a man. I spell m-a-n, man.” Just that. The signifier has the
last word.
Enslaved by the Signifier
Lacan, in a rather pessimistic and deterministic statement, says: “If what Freud discovered
[…] has a meaning, it is that the signifier's displacement determines subjects' acts, destiny,
refusals, blindnesses, success, and fate, regardless of their innate gifts and instruction, and
irregardless  of  their  character  or  sex;  and that  everything  pertaining  to  the  psychological
pregiven follows willy-nilly the signifier's train, like weapons and baggage3.” In this view, we
3 Écrits, p.21, Seminar on “The Purloined Letter”, 1955.
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are truly and fundamentally enslaved by the signifier, inescapably chained by the signifying
chains.
From méconnaissance to mensonge
Whereas in the Imaginary,  the subject does not want to know the driving force the image
exerts on him, in the Symbolic the subject equally does not want to know how much he is
enslaved and determined by the signifier. We could qualify the shift from an imaginary to a
symbolic subject theory as a shift from one kind of not wanting to know to another, as a shift
from one kind of lie to another. The particular types of lies I am talking about here are the
méconnaissance and  the  mensonge.  In  Lacan's  early  thinking  about  the  subject  of  the
Imaginary, it is the identification with the image of the other that is the fundamental lie, the
méconnaissance, the misrecognition that is constitutive of the ego. In Lacan's shift towards
the subject of the Symbolic, at the heart of subjectivity we find the signifier  and it is the
mensonge, the lie, that is constitutive of subjectivity, as the subject is now defined as being an
effect of language. 
First I will discuss what happens to  méconnaissance  in Lacan's theory of the subject of the
Symbolic, then I’ll talk about the mensonge.
Méconnaissance: from the subject to the analyst
When  Lacan  shifts  his  attention  to  the  subject  of  the  Symbolic,  he  still  talks  about
méconnaissance, but now, the fundamental méconnaissance that needs to be recognized is not
that  of  the  subject  but  that  of  the  analyst.  In  the  early  texts  of  the  Écrits,  the  word
méconnaissance always refers to the subject and his relationship to the image of the other, in
later texts  méconnaissance mostly refers to errant psychoanalysts who refuse to realize that
the  origins  of  their  profession  lie  in  speech  and  language.  So  the  main  victim  of
méconnaissance is  now no longer  the  subject,  but  the  analyst  who is  deceiving  himself,
misrecognizing himself and thereby of course deceiving his analysands on the basis of his
misrecognition,  steering them away from the full  realization of their  being subjects of the
Symbolic.
As an interesting aside, we see this shift reflected in the way méconnaissance is translated in
the English version of the Écrits (I'm referring to Mr. Fink's translation). When it refers to the
méconnaissance as the foundation of the ego, it is consistently translated as misrecognition.
When it refers to the méconnaissance of the importance of the Symbolic by the practitioners
of  ego psychology,  it  is  variously  translated  as  ignorance,  misunderstanding,  neglect  and
failure to realize. Once, when Freud's méconnaissance is discussed, it gets the more friendly
translation of oversight – Lacan even calls it “a surprising oversight4.” 
Lacan warns his fellow analysts that whenever they are misrecognizing the misrecognition
that  founds  the  subject  of  the  Imaginary,  they  are  only  adding  to  the  subject's  further
alienation by trying to fixate meaning and identity on some sort of imaginary essence, instead
of affirming the elusive nature of both by recognizing their origins in the shifting interplay of
signifiers that constitutes the subject of the Symbolic. As the fundamental discord can never
be resolved for the subject, neither in the Imaginary, nor in the Symbolic, there is no ultimate
image to (mis)recognize oneself in, no final last word to be said about oneself, psychoanalysts
4 Écrits, p.95, Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis, 1948, [méconnaissance bien surprenante].
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are warned against believing themselves to be able to do just that, warned against reducing
their analysands to anything other than to subjects of the Symbolic. 
An analysand of mine started consulting me after a so-called burn-out. His job-coach career-
advice sessions did not have the desired effect, so he decided to come and talk about things.
After some time, he tells me a dream. In the dream he meets a group of his former colleagues,
who  invite  him  to  join  them,  they  tell  him  they  now  call  themselves  la  familia. The
interpretation of this dream evidently led him to further question his imaginary identifications
with the company he worked for and the substantial importance his job had in his life. But it
was the resonance of the single signifier  familia that ultimately enabled him to overcome a
hesitation of many years and led him to propose to his girlfriend, of Italian origin, with the
intent of starting a  familia of his own. So it was the workings of the signifier that put him
back on track and ultimately back to work.
For, as we will go into next, as the subject is now defined as being enslaved by the Symbolic,
the  margins  of  freedom  to  be  found  in  that  enslavement  are  situated  precisely  in  the
recognition of  being the subject of the Symbolic, and not in being steered by an unwitting
analyst towards the adoption of some sort of final truth about oneself.
The subject: from méconnaissance to mensonge
Now we turn our attention from the analyst’s méconnaissance to the subject's mensonge, the
lie. Within the context of psychoanalysis and the concept of the unconscious, the lie and the
truth  have  a  more  complicated  relationship  than  the  basic  “true  or  false”  distinction.
Sometimes the lie is the clearest way of revealing the truth. As illustrated in the most famous
of psychoanalytic lies, the  Verneinung (usually translated as 'negation' or 'denial'), which is
the partial lift of repression through denial (“It's not my mother!”), as a way of revealing the
truth (“Hi, mom!”). So, as psychoanalysts we know better than to simply believe what people
tell us, but we also know better than to simply assume we are being lied to. We assume there
might be some other truth than that which is being said, or maybe some more truth in what is
not being said, and yet we have nowhere else but the analysand’s speech in which to find
some truth. 
The psychoanalyst doesn’t take the discourse of the analysand at face value, but he doesn’t
take  it  simply  to  be  a  lie  either,  but  as  potentially  implying  something  else  or  pointing
elsewhere. The analyst, says Lacan, “takes the description of an everyday event as a fable
addressed as a word to the wise, a long prosopopeia as a direct interjection, and, contrariwise,
a simple slip of the tongue as a highly complex statement, and even the rest of a silence as the
whole lyrical development it stands in for5.”
The way Lacan describes man as being the subject  of the Symbolic,  this  subject  now no
longer defined by the imaginary relation to the other (with lowercase o) but by the symbolic
relation to the Other (with capital O) as the Other of language. Lacan defines this Other as:
“this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which my lie
subsists. Here we see that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language6.”
Lacan also says: “speech constitutes truth; even if  it  is  destined to deceive7.” and “Man's
5 Écrits, p.209, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
6 Écrits, p.436, The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, 1957.
7 Écrits, p.209, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
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language, the instrument of his lies, is thoroughly ridden with the problem of truth8.” Later he
will say: “For the man who breaks the bread of truth with his semblable in the act of speech
shares a lie9.” It seems that the lie, the mensonge, is not so much an inclination of the subject,
but a fundamental quality of the Symbolic order. 
So who is doing the lying? The subject? The analysand? The analyst? In the end it is the
signifier that deceives. And we are all destined to be deceived by the signifier. So then what is
truth? We will discuss this when we talk about the consequences for clinical practice and the
psychoanalyst, which we come to now.
Psychoanalysis and the subject of the Symbolic
As the subject is now defined as “a pure speaking subject as we say a pure pork paté10,” as
Lacan would later quip, the role of the analyst is no longer to offer “the pure mirror of a
smooth surface11,” as Lacan previously described the analyst's task vis-à-vis the subject of the
Imaginary. Now, the analyst is advised to be “permeable to the other's authentic speech12,”
with as  his  main  role  “to support  speech13.” Now, psychoanalysts  are  described as  being
“practitioners of the symbolic function14,” and are advised to “play on the power of symbols
by evoking them in a calculated fashion15.”
When an analysand talks  about being king,  it  should evoke in us not some the image or
essence of a king, not even the question of the reality of this claim, but the full range of the
signifier king, which we might then bring into play. We might mention King Solomon or King
Kong, the King of Hearts, the King of Kings, King Arthur, King Midas or B.B. King, even
Elvis the King, and Shakespeare's King Lear. We might go from the Ant King, the Fisher
King, the Lion King to the Gipsy Kings, the Mad King and the Night King. To be a royal king
might be a royal pain, from King Crab to the king of crap, from Martin Luther King and
Rodney King to a Fairy King or a Viking or we could be twerking at Burger King. To show
them who's the kinkiest king-size king of them all, the king of the hill with no next of kin,
safe Prince Charming and his Crown Jewels, or are we sinking from the Troll King to the Sea
King, seeking the wording fit for a king, the final king, the king of the castle, long live the
king, King Signifier, the signifier  king. “To be evoked in a calculated fashion,” as in  to be
applied with moderation.
As Lacan redefines  psychoanalytic  action  pertaining  to  the subject  of  the  Symbolic,  it  is
precisely the acceptance of being the subject of the Symbolic that is the ultimate goal of the
psychoanalytic cure and where its final truth is to be found.
Even though Lacan locates truth in the subject's history, he writes: “The unconscious is the
chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a lie: it is the censored chapter.
But the truth can be refound; most often it has already been written elsewhere16.” And he
8 Écrits, p.136, Presentation on Psychical Causality, 1946.
9 Écrits, p.316, Introduction to Jean Hyppolite's Commentary on Freud's “Verneinung”, 1954.
10 Séminaire IX (1961-1962), 29.11.1964, “un sujet ‘pur parlant’ [...] comme on dit un paté pur porc.”
11 Écrits, p.89, Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis, 1948.
12 Écrits, p.292, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
13 Écrits, p.292, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953: “supports
speech [porte la parole]”.
14 Écrits, p.235, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
15 Écrits, p.243, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
16 Écrits, p.215, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
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defines the purpose of psychoanalysis as the assumption of this history: “This assumption by
the subject of his history, insofar as it is constituted by speech addressed to another, is clearly
the  basis  of  the  new  method  Freud  called  psychoanalysis17.”  But  this  history  is  being
reinterpreted and rewritten as we speak, by the very act of speaking about it. So the goal of
psychoanalysis is not the discovery of a truth that is already out there, but, as Lacan says it:
“to reorder past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessity to come18.” So,
this truth is never just a pre-existing essence to be simply revealed, it is always something that
appears in, and is constructed through, the interaction between analyst and analysand.
Freedom in slavery
In John 8:32 it is written, “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free19,”
to that we should add Nietzsche's dictum, “He who cannot lie does not know what truth is20.”
We have to realize that, once we enter the Symbolic (or should we say once the Symbolic
enters us) the truth and the lie are closely related. It is only because we are constituted through
the lie of the signifier that we know what truth is and only because we know the truth of the
signifier that it perpetually eludes us. Lacan would later famously say about truth that we can
only half-say it21. So perhaps the final truth is that we are condemned to keep on lying and at
the same time condemned to try and find some truth in our lies. Luckily we can do this with a
little help from our psychoanalyst friends.
We are determined by the signifier, enslaved by it, bound to never be able to get out of its
incessantly moving chains. And yet at the same time, it is also the source of our freedom, for
as long as we are talking  about  the signifier,  there is  always room for  interpretation,  for
transformation, for redefining. So that in the end, we are bound by the signifier but never by a
single signification.  To conclude with a suitable  quote from Lacan,  which shows that  we
never stop looking back and redefining what we find there from our current vantage point:
“What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it is no more,
nor even the perfect as what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have
been, given what I am in the process of becoming22.”
17 Écrits, p.213, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
18 Écrits, p.213, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
19 “Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then are ye my
disciples indeed; And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” KJV, John 8:31-32.
20 Also sprach Zarathustra, “Wer nicht lügen kann, weiß nicht, was Wahrheit ist.”
21 Séminaire XVII (1969-1970), 14.01.1970, “qu’elle nous est accessible que d’un mi-dire, qu’elle ne
peut se dire tout entière, pour la raison qu’au-delà de sa moitié il n’y a rien à dire.”
22 Écrits, p.247, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 1953.
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